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The introduction of index-based derivatives is one of the most important 
developments in post-war financial markets; today these contracts are amongst the 
most commonly traded financial instruments. Yet, no sociological accounts based 
on empirical material have focused on the creation of index-based derivatives as a 
social and political institution. This paper offers index-based derivatives as a topic 
for sociological investigation. Focusing on the creation and regulatory approval of 
the first exchange-traded index-based futures in the early 1980s, the paper assesses 
empirical evidence collected through interviews with key figures who took part in 
the historical events, as well as extensive archival research. The paper makes two 
central claims. Firstly, that the nature of index-based financial markets is critically 
dependent on the nature of the qualification process it undergoes – a process 
through which the particular qualities are negotiated and attached to the products 
and in particular on the viability of the connections made between the financial 
contract and the assets on which it is based. Secondly, that qualification of products 
takes place within a network made up of heterogeneous agents, whose worldviews 
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Contracts that use financial indices as their underlying 'asset' are known collectively 
as index-based derivatives. They are currently amongst the most widely traded 
financial products2 . Furthermore, the introduction of index-based derivatives is 
considered by many as the single most significant development in the history of 
contemporary financial markets (Chance, 1995; Arditti, 1996; Kolb 1997a, b). The 
use of index-based futures has become a standard practice in the financial world. 
The portfolios of banks, pension funds, insurance companies and governments 
commonly include index-based derivatives. In fact, index-based contracts have 
become such an indispensable feature of the global financial system that it would be 
safe to say that there are millions in the western world who own, either directly or 
indirectly (even unknowingly), derivatives.  
 
In spite of their central role in today's financial arenas, index-based contracts 
received little attention within sociological analyses of financial markets. Several 
sociologists refer to the role that index-based contracts play constructing hedging 
positions and to the way in which they are used in arbitrage trading (for example, 
Beunza and Stark, 2004; MacKenzie, 2006). Yet, there exists no published 
sociological work that traces the social history of that market and analyses the 
evolution of index-based derivatives and the network of institutions in which this 
process unfolded. This paper is a first step in recognising the importance of index-
based financial instruments as a topic for sociological investigation.  
 
How are we to conceptualize index-based derivative contracts sociologically? The 
empirical material in this paper suggests that the various actors that took part in 
shaping index-based contracts developed and practiced different cognitive, 
ideological and organizational schemes through which they perceived the markets. 
The network of actors within which index-based derivatives evolved includes 
several different organizations: the staff of commodity exchanges, commodity 
traders and financial regulators. Such constellation, with its variety of actors, lends 
itself to a multifaceted view of the market; a view that suggests that economic 
action should be understood through the different, and frequently conflicting, 
worldviews held by the diverse actors who make up markets and by the actions they 
performed. A good starting point for describing the process of qualification is the 
work of Zelizer, who offered a model of ‘multiple markets’ aimed at ‘identifying 
types and patterns of social, structural and cultural variations’ in those markets 
(Zelizer, 2005). Zelizer applied her model to empirical cases and analyzed the 
development of different social perceptions about money (Zelizer, 1989). Zelizer’s 
seminal work about the creation of ‘types of money’ can be seen as a description of 
a multifaceted process of product qualification. Zelizer showed that, in spite of the 
fundamental practice through which money is used (ie the transaction) being  
accepted by all of the actors, through the practice of transaction and its 
implications, the actors gave different interpretations to the uses and meaning of 
money. Similarly, actors may agree on a set of basic qualities that a product should 
acquire, yet, the practices in which the product takes part may bring about 
dramatically different results than the initial qualification attempts.  
                                                 
2
 According to the Bank of International Settlements, the total notional amounts outstanding in 2006 
were US$207 trillion for over-the-counter (outside market) interest rate swaps and US$14 trillion for 
market-traded options, forwards, futures and swaps (Bank of International Settlements, 2006). 
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A critical component of the qualification process is the attempt (which may be 
successful or unsuccessful) to sort perceived characteristics into categories. That is, 
the process of creating a link between certain qualities. In this respect, the 
conceptual theory in this paper (product qualification) is related to the work done 
by Bowker and Leigh Star (Bowker & Leigh Star, 1999). Bowker and Leigh Star 
analyse classificatory systems and trace the ways in which they become embedded 
into bureaucratic infrastructures to become part of the taken-for-granted reality of 
organizational structures. Using detailed case studies, Bowker and Leigh Star 
outline several general historical heuristics along the lines of which classificatory 
systems come about and how their legitimacy is proposed and contested. This 
process of institutionalization is a vital part of the organizational implication of the 
qualification process. That is, it describes how the networks of connections both 
within organizations and among them create and legitimize rules and practices. This 
paper, in contrast, focuses on the qualification practices and their performance 
rather than on the resulting structures of such actions. In fact, by focusing on the 
action-related dimensions of product qualification, this paper tries to strengthen one 
of Bowker and Leigh Star's more provocative conclusions, the futility of separating 
agents from the structure in which they operate.  
  
The notions that qualification – the shaping of products – is performed by 
heterogeneous agents and that qualities are attached to products through market 
practices provide a general framework for understanding the process. Such notions 
can help us to identify the mechanisms of qualification at any given time. Yet, such 
a snapshot view of the market is not sufficient. If we assume that qualification takes 
place through the operation of social institutions, and not through the application of 
universal laws, then we cannot assume that such institutions are static. In fact, by 
regarding qualification as a dynamic process, this paper refers to a specific theory 
of action: the Actor-Network theory (ANT), and more specifically to the work 
about qualification done by French sociologists Callon, Méadel, and Rabeharisoa 
(Callon et al 2001). As we will see in the discussion below, ANT and the specific 
form of qualification proposed by Callon et al capture the dynamic nature of the 
process. That is, qualities of a product are not simply assigned to it, but instead are 
the outcomes of actions in which the product participates.  
 
However, before we draw a more complete picture regarding qualification, we need 
to ask how the tools that perform the process – the social institutions of the markets 
– are held together. One of the influential answers given to this question is that 
markets are not independent institutions, but are based on the existing social 
network, or, in other words, are embedded in those networks. In an influential 
paper, Granovetter argued that economic behaviour is embedded in networks of 
personal relations (Granovetter, 1985), which in turn are bound by cultural and 
social frameworks. These sets of social networks encompass the norms and values 
that are manifested in their infrastructures, the actions of the participants, and the 
interactions between the two spheres.  
 
If markets are an intractable part of the larger social environment, then what does 
this tell us about the nature of the qualification process? First, we need to assume 
that the process does not operate in a linear fashion, but rather in network-like one. 
That is, the various actors that shape the products do not operate one after the other, 
but rather interact with each other, and products are shaped through these 
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interactions. A second assumption that stems from the interactive and networked 
perspective of product qualification is that the various actors may promote different 
(and even conflicting) ideas about the desired shape and function of the product. As 
a result, the qualification process should be regarded less as an orchestrated effort, 
and more as a competitive one. In this respect, it can be expected that any set of 
qualities attached to a product through the interaction of actors may be challenged 
by alternative sets of qualities that other coalitions of actors propose. Lastly, the 
networked nature of the qualification process places the evolution of markets 
themselves in a new light. In particular, the relations between the products and the 
markets in which they are traded may need to be re-examined. If qualification is a 
process in which different actors take part, and in which conflicting worldviews 
clash, can we assume that the market itself does not change as a result of such 
process? In other words, is qualification a process that takes place in the market, or 
is it, to a similar degree, a qualification of the market as a whole?  
 
As mentioned above, when referring to the implicit continuum between the market 
and its products, the notions of markets as norm-making institutions and as 
networks can be complemented by the work of Actor-Network theorists. The notion 
of qualification as developed in this paper is related to a similar concept presented 
in an influential paper by Callon, Méadel, and Rabeharisoa (Callon et al 2001). The 
motivation behind the analytical effort in this paper and the one behind Callon et 
al’s paper is similar: an effort to understand where products come from. These 
similarities, however, are limited to the contours of the theoretical approaches, 
while the contents are significantly different. Callon suggests that qualification 
operates through the continual creation and recreation of relations between the 
evolving products and existing products. The temporary outcomes of these 
comparative exercises are created each time the qualified product is bought and 
sold. This schematic framework is a very powerful conceptual tool because it 
allows us to treat products as a chain composed of connected qualification attempts. 
Yet, the qualification of financial products includes aspects that call for broadening 
and reconfiguration of existing concepts in economic sociology as the relationship 
between the products and their attached practices is different from most markets 
described so far in the literature. In the cases of products such as wine bottles or 
cars, for example, there is a visible distinction between the practices of trading, in 
which the qualities of the products take part in constructing the prices of the 
products, and between the practices through which the qualities are established and 
tested.  However, in the case of financial products (like index-based derivatives) no 
such distinction exists; a crucial part in the qualification of financial products is 
performed on the trading floor. Thus, the way financial products ‘behave’ in the 
market is not only a test of their qualities, but the market is also one of the arenas 
where these qualities are formed and attached to the product. As the empirical 
material shows, the practices through which the qualities of financial products were 
established had a dramatic impact on the evolution of the markets. 
 
 
The construction of deliverability: early history of commodities futures 
 
Derivatives are financial contracts whose market price is derived from the price of 
an underlying asset. Agricultural commodities, shares and stock indices are just 
some of the most common underlying entities for which derivative are designed. 
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The central claim that this paper makes is that, to understand the social dimension 
of derivatives in general (and index-based ones in particular), it is necessary to trace 
the development of the links between the underlying entities and the derivative 
contract. More specifically, it is vital to understand the nature of the qualities of the 
underlying assets and how these qualities are translated into institutionalized market 
mechanisms, practices and conventions. The dynamic historical process through 
which the qualities of the underlying assets are linked to the derivative contract – 
the qualification of the contract – is central to the analysis of index-based contracts. 
To analyse the complex historical process of the qualification of index-based 
derivatives we need to trace the evolution and the influence of two key factors in 
the commodity futures markets where these financial contracts were first traded: (1) 
the deliverability of underlying assets and (2) the nexus of connections between the 
futures exchanges and the regulatory establishment. 
 
The first American market to trade derivative contracts, the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT), started trading in 1848. The commodities-based contracts (known as 
'forwards') traded in the CBOT specified the terms of mutual obligations of the 
buyer and the seller to, respectively, deliver and pay for a specified amount of 
product (of a certain quality) on a set date. For example, a typical contract might 
include the obligation to deliver 20 tons of potatoes of a given variety and of a 
given quality at a given date in return for a set amount. The terms of each contract 
had to be negotiated by the buyer and seller: the date in which delivery of the 
agricultural product was to take place (the contracts' 'expiration date'), the exact 
nature and quality of the product and the price to be paid on delivery. Since forward 
contracts were designed for the needs of the two specific parties to the future 
transaction, they had little use outside the particular setting.  
 
In 1851, three years after its inception, the CBOT took a revolutionary step and 
standardized the bilateral forwards. The standardized forward contracts, which 
became to be known as 'futures', were templates that included the terms of the 
contract and left only the contract’s price to be negotiated between the parties. Any 
futures contract bearing the same expiration date and underlying asset became 
interchangeable with any similar contract, regardless of the identity of the traders 
who bought it initially. By standardizing the contracts, the time-consuming stage of 
negotiations over the details of the contracts was eliminated and trading became 
faster and more efficient. However, contracts standardisation had far-reaching 
implications: standardisation made the contracts themselves tradable. With tradable 
contracts the traders were effectively relieved of the necessity of owning the 
underlying agricultural products on which the contracts were based. In other words, 
the traders could buy and sell the contracts among themselves and, when the 
expiration date was approaching, offset their obligations by acquiring contracts that 
were the 'other side' of their transactions. For example, a trader holding a contract 
requiring him to buy 500 pounds of corn at the end of the month would offset his 
obligations by buying a contract requiring him to sell the same amount of the same 
type of corn at that date.  
 
After the standardisation of the contracts, the CBOT and futures trading witnessed a 
long period of growth. The popularity of futures trading gave rise to bets that were 
taken on the prices that the market would quote. In the late 1880s, that practice of 
betting on futures' prices gained popularity and by the end of the century, there 
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were numerous shops that sold contracts that were based on CBOT-traded prices of 
agricultural futures (Fabian, 1990). CBOT regarded those establishments, 
commonly known as ‘bucket shops’, as illegitimate competition. Firstly because the 
bucket shops were piggybacking on information that originated from the CBOT 
(where the prices were determined) and offered no compensation for that service. 
Secondly because betting on futures’ prices was taking potential customers from the 
CBOT and thus denying commissions to CBOT members. In the late 1890s and 
early 1900s, the CBOT embarked on a fierce legal battle against the bucket shops, 
at the end of which (and after several landmark court cases (Ferris 1988)) the 
operation of the shops was declared illegal and terminated.  
 
The main argument used by the CBOT in its legal struggle against the bucket shops 
was that contracts that did not include a specific obligation for the delivery of 
goods, and were settle-able only through the payment of cash could not count as 
legitimate commercial activity but were essentially gambling. CBOT’s carefully 
constructed argument struck a chord with broader anti-gambling emotions in the 
American society of the time. Following this initial success, the association 
between cash-settlement and gambling did not remain limited to institutions like the 
bucket shops, but was extended (at least implicitly) to all other possible cash-settled 
forward contracts (Fabian, 1990). The construction of a boundary between futures 
trading and gambling based around product delivery did not stop with the court 
cases. A lobbying effort by the CBOT also brought about a change in Illinois’ 
gambling laws, forbidding the trading of cash-settled contracts and allowing only 
contracts that included the option to deliver the goods. The changes in Illinois law 
were followed by a number of other Midwestern states (Cronon, 1991). Moreover, 
the notion of similarity between cash-settlement and illegal betting, in its wider 
form, became a common argument against the trading of financial contracts and 
even against the immoral nature of financial markets in general. For example, 
bucket shops were mentioned in the Congressional debates in the early 1930s that 
led to the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
(Shapiro, 1984). 
 
Although deliverability was crucial for establishment of the CBOT as an economic 
and political institution, the actual delivery of products has all but disappeared. The 
success of standardized futures and the ease with which futures were offset eroded 
the importance of deliverability. Over the decades since the introduction of 
standardized futures in the mid 19th century the proportion of traders who actually 
took part in a delivery of products dwindled constantly. By the 1950s it was clear 
that the vast majority of futures contracts were not settled in delivery and most 
estimates were that only in 3%-5% of futures goods actually changed hands (Clark, 
1978; Markham, 1987). The rest of the transactions were settled by offsetting the 
obligations in the contracts through buying or selling ‘opposite’ ones. This yawning 
gap between the volumes of futures trading and actual deliveries of the products for 
which the products were written was not merely an evolving feature of agricultural 
futures exchanges like the CBOT. In effect, the discrepancy between trading futures 
and delivery became one of the main growth engines for futures markets. 
Nominally, each futures contract was backed up by the underlying agricultural 
product in the amounts and qualities specified in the contract. However, in practice, 
the volume of futures contracts traded made the actual delivery of the underlying 
products unrealistic for a considerable proportion of the futures contracts as trading 
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grew 100-fold in the first century of the CBOT (Tamarkin, 1993). Such 
phenomenal growth would not have been possible had all the transactions ended up 
in delivery of the agricultural products.  
 
The fact that most futures transactions ended in offsetting the contracts rather than 
in delivery had a crucial effect on the institutional evolution of the market. The 
CBOT, like virtually all other American futures exchanges, was a member's 
organization and the governance of the organization was dominated by the interests 
and the ambitions of the members – the traders. Since the traders’ financial well-
being was dependent on profits made through trading and since virtually all trading 
was settled in exchanging contracts rather than delivering products, the exact nature 
of the agricultural commodity underlying the futures was marginal in comparison 
with the tradability of the contract. Consequently, one of the CBOT’s 
institutionalized goals, expressed in its code of conduct as well as through informal 
norms, was to generate and maintain large volumes of trading and to search 
constantly for ways to increase that volume. The institutional motivation to increase 
the trading volume drove the futures exchanges to expand their repertoire of 
contracts and over the years, at times of weakening in the commodities markets for 
‘traditional’ products (eg grain and cattle), dozens of other contracts were 
developed and offered - among them plywood, soy bean, soy meal and frozen 
concentrated orange juice.  
 
This analysis of the historical path of futures markets shows that the deliverability 
of the underlying asset was crucial for the legitimacy of futures, and indeed was 
embedded in the coded norms of gambling laws. However, at the same time the 
actual practices in the markets rendered the physicality of the assets irrelevant. 
Moreover, it was crucial for the growth and prosperity of the exchanges that 
deliverability would be possible in principle, but in the vast majority of the cases 
would not be performed in practice. As the continuation of the historical narrative 
shows, the deeply embedded tension regarding deliverability of commodities-based 
futures contracts will play a significant role in the creation of index-based contracts. 
 
 
Regulators and exchanges in the network of qualification 
 
From 1969 to 1971, the agricultural commodities markets witnessed a period of low 
trading volume (Yamey 1985). This period coincided with the gradual demise of 
the currencies' gold standard; a process that allowed currency exchange rates to 
float ‘freely’ (Hutchins 1995) and turned currencies into a much more risky product 
than they had been beforehand. The futures exchanges, whose members were 
struggling due to the slow grains market, saw the more volatile currencies markets 
as a promising business opportunity.  Consequently, in 1971, Leo Melamed of the 
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (the CBOT’s arch-rival futures exchange) began to 
promote a plan for trading futures contracts based on foreign currencies (Melamed 
1988). Melamed’s initiative, the International Monetary Market (IMM), 
commenced trading in 1972. Volatile currency markets contributed to high volumes 
in currency futures and within a short period of time the new type of futures 
generated large trading volumes. Following this success other agricultural futures 
markets developed similar contracts and within months the commodities regulator, 
the Commodity Exchange Authority (CEA) in the Department of Agriculture, 
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received notices from several other American commodities exchanges about their 
intentions to apply for permissions to trade futures on non-agricultural products (R* 
interview).  
 
Currency futures broke the virtually exclusive association that futures markets had 
held with agricultural products for over a century. Non-agricultural futures 
signalled that the futures exchanges were aiming to expand their potential customer 
base by attracting investors from the general business community and, in particular, 
from the financial sector. These trends created a challenge for the regulatory 
process related to approving new contracts. Non-agricultural futures were an 
unknown territory for the Department of Agriculture and, following the success of 
futures on currencies, concerns were raised among the futures exchanges that the 
mandatory approval of contracts might be slowed considerably due to lack of 
knowledge. The severity of the regulatory challenge was manifested in the form 
requesting information about proposed contracts required by the CME as part of the 
regulatory approval of currencies futures. The form asked, among other things, 
about the size, location and condition of the warehouses in which the underlying 
commodities would be stored (Melamed 1988).  
 
In 1973, growing concerns about the suitability of the existing regulatory regime 
led the CBOT to initiate an intensive lobbying offensive in Washington to persuade 
the American Congress to change the commodities regulatory structure. Concerns 
about the CEA's suitability for regulating the evolving futures world were not the 
only reason for the lobbying campaign. Since futures contracts were no longer 
associated exclusively with agricultural products, they were now potential 
candidates to be transferred to another regulatory authority, one more suitable for 
the regulation of financial products. The possibility about which the CBOT was 
particularly concerned was whether the American Congress would define futures on 
financial products as securities and consequently transfer the regulation of the 
contracts to the Securities and Exchange Commission.  
 
These concerns were not without basis. The same weak trading period in grain 
markets that motivated the CME to develop the currencies futures also drove the 
CBOT to fund research into the possibility of trading options on stocks.3 Options, 
being underlined by stocks, were regarded as securities and thus the SEC was given 
jurisdiction over the contracts. The CBOT’s proposal to trade stock options in an 
organized exchange underwent a long and exhaustive approval process by the SEC. 
In the CBOT’s case, the regulatory process took more than three years and required 
considerable effort by lawyers and exchange staff. Following these events, when 
the commodities exchanges’ lobbying effort succeeded in bringing about 
Congressional hearings about the future of futures regulation, it promoted one 
message above all others: financial futures should not be regulated by the SEC. R*.  
At the time, a CBOT lawyer heading the lobbying effort in Washington was heard 
to say: 
’Damn! We’re not gonna go through all that again [referring to the protracted 
approval process of stock options]. We’re gonna make sure that whatever 
agency comes out of that Congressional process for the futures community has 
exclusive jurisdiction over everything and nobody else is going to torment us 
for three years the way these guys [SEC] did.    (R* interview) 
                                                 
3
 For a detailed discussion of this historical process see MacKenzie & Millo, 2003 
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The main argument of the lobbying team was that CME’s currencies futures opened 
the floodgates to a new wave of financial futures, and that futures based on a variety 
of financial products would soon be proposed. That situation, the argument 
continued, may lead to an ‘administrative hell’ in which an exchange that would 
offer, say, futures on Treasury bills, crude oil and orange juice would have to go 
through separate approval procedures with the Treasury Department, with the 
Department of Energy and with the Department of Agriculture. Moreover, 
whenever a change to the contracts was necessary, each of the agencies that 
regulated the underlying products would have to be notified. Hence, in a world 
where futures were no longer limited to agricultural products, regulation according 
to the underlying products was no longer feasible. Instead, the exchanges’ lobbying 
suggested that a new agency should be created to have exclusive regulative 
authority over all futures contracts. In other words, a new principle of regulatory 
taxonomy was presented: regulation based on the type of contract rather than the 
underlying commodity.  
 
The contract-centric approach was accepted by the American Congress, and in May 
1974 the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) was amended to facilitate the creation 
of a new regulatory agency - the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). 
Under this legal structure, the CFTC was given exclusive rights over the regulatory 
aspects of the qualification of futures contracts: since futures could not be traded 
without such an approval the CFTC became an obligatory point of passage in the 
topology of the qualification network. In the regulatory landscape that was to 
follow the law change, the CFTC became an indispensable part of any vector 
connecting a potential underlying asset, an exchange and a tradable futures contract.  
 
The new regulator created new potential challenges. The broad regulatory definition 
created a conceptual blur between this new financial product and existing securities 
products, and created uncertainty regarding the regulatory domains of financial 
markets. For example, being the exclusive regulator of futures meant the CFTC had 
jurisdiction over futures on any asset – potentially including securities. However, 
the SEC already had exclusive jurisdiction over securities and stock options. This 
led to the following dilemma: if futures on securities were to be proposed,  which of 
the two bodies (CFTC or SEC) would regulate them? 
 
Such a qualification challenge was not merely hypothetical. In October 1975, the 
CFTC approved an application by the CBOT to trade futures on a financial product 
- mortgage-backed certificates known as GNMAs (US GAO, 2000:5).4 At the same 
time, an application by the CME was pending to trade futures on Treasury Bills 
(Johnson 1976), and several of the twelve other American commodity exchanges 
had applications in various stages of completion. It was the common opinion among 
the SEC’s staff that futures on GNMAs would erode the distinction between 
securities and commodities. This trend was observed by the SEC with much 
concern,  as it threatened its regulatory territory. The potential conflict between the 
interests of the two regulators had serious implications for the qualification of 
                                                 
4
 Government National Mortgage Association pass-through certificates were known in short as 
GNMA’s. The GNMA certificates gave their owners a proportion of an income generated by a pool 
of mortgages. The certificates’ payments were guaranteed by the Government National Mortgage 
Association, part of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, which made the GNMA-
based futures an attractive contract. 
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financial futures. Futures could not be traded without regulatory approval and such 
approval was not likely to be given while the regulatory identity of the contracts 
was disputed.  
 
The challenge to the qualification of financial futures was embedded in a broader, 
deeply-rooted rivalry between the two regulators. The immediate issues that 
troubled the SEC’s staff were the possibility of the SEC’s jurisdictional turf being 
limited as a result of the new broad definition that was given to the concept of 
commodities in the 1974 Act.  But, these concerns were underpinned by a more 
general perception about the nature of commodities markets and their regulation. A 
senior staff member of the SEC’s division of market regulation in the mid 70s 
described the SEC’s staff attitude to the CFTC: 
People who moved from the SEC to the CFTC thought that the CFTC was the 
end of the world. They were dealing with a bunch of dinosaurs over there. 
They just could not get them [CFTC] to understand the need for any kind of 
regulatory oversight.         (M* interview) 
 
The view, commonly held by SEC staff, that the SEC was a better regulator than 
the CFTC and that its staff was more professional than that of the new regulator 
should not be dismissed merely as a sign of inter-regulatory rivalry. These views 
belong to a broader perception that contributed to the shaping of the qualification 
struggle between the two regulators. G*, who was the chief economist of the SEC 
when the CFTC was established, described the common view about commodities 
futures at the SEC:  
Commodities were just… they smelled, you know. Commodities were really 
viewed like gambling. […]. It’s like saying: ‘when people put those quarters in 
the slots, that is really an investment’ and you [the SEC] got to regulate the 
casinos. I think it’s a cultural thing.      (G* interview) 
 
This perspective encapsulates both the nature of qualification and the contours of 
the qualification conflict that took place in the inter-regulatory sphere. As the 
history of markets for agricultural commodities indicates, products gain their 
relative position in the market and their qualities through the practices to which 
they are attached. If commodity trading is comparable to gambling, and the actual 
practice of trading is compared to pulling the handle of a slot machine, then the 
message is clear: futures cannot be used for conducting sound, calculable 
investment and putting money into them is equal to the luck-determined practice of 
gambling. This is not the entire message, however. At the time, the SEC and the 
CFTC were engaged in a struggle over the definition of futures contracts and the 
struggle was, in many respects, a zero-sum game. Any regulatory ‘territory’ lost by 
one regulator would most likely be given to the other. In this light, the quote above 
(and the general opinion about commodities) should be regarded as an implicit 
opinion about the SEC as much as it was a direct opinion about the CFTC. If 
commodities trading is equal to gambling, then securities trading (the other activity 
in this dichotomy) should be seen as legitimate investment.  
 
Such views underlined the conflict about the qualification of futures. Yet, for the 
SEC, having a decisive impact on product qualification was not the ultimate goal.  
Qualification was seen as a step towards the more important goal, to distinguish its 
regulatory domain from that of the CFTC. The SEC, established in the early 30s, 
was the more well-established of the two regulators and had better chances to 
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recruit influential supporters and to impose its definition. However, given that the 
CFTC had exclusive statutory rights over regulation of all futures and since the 
definition of commodities included financial products, the separation between the 
two regulatory fields of securities and commodities no longer existed. In this 
situation, the SEC’s staff knew that in order to avoid the threat of having its 
regulatory domain taken over by the CFTC, the boundaries between the regulatory 
areas would need to be reconstructed. 
 
This insight motivated the staff of the SEC to promote the maintainance of a 
distinction between securities (the exclusive domain of the SEC) and the types of 
assets that underlay futures trading. Internal discussions at the SEC took place in 
the months after the amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act.  In December 
1975, the chairman of the SEC (Roderick Hills) sent a letter to the chairman of 
CFTC suggesting that: 
Both the CFTC and this Commission should be concerned, not with bare 
questions of jurisdiction, but with a number of important questions relating to 
the integration of our capital markets […]  Can a meaningful distinction be 
drawn[…] between securities options […] and futures contracts […] and if so, 
what is it?                         (Hills 1975) 
 
The two regulators were not the only agents involved in this political struggle. Due 
to the dense network of ties between the organizational actors, the debate over the 
shape of qualification had important implications for the exchanges. The futures 
exchanges, which were regulated by the CFTC, wished to expand their catalogue of 
the contracts, and not transfer to the stricter regulatory regime of the SEC. The 
CBOT, the leading futures market of the time, directed an intensive lobbying effort 
aiming to persuade the American Congress to incorporate within the law a 
legislative definition of acceptable underlying assets that was as wide as possible, 
so as to include as many potential financial assets under the jurisdiction of the 
CFTC. R*, one of the leading commodities lawyers at the time, coordinated 
CBOT’s lobbying effort:  
I was looking for something that I thought would capture everything that one 
could think of and did not include securities […] I could not say securities 
because it would have alerted the SEC. So we used this phrasing – "services, 
rights and interests"… and crossed our fingers and hoped that the courts will 
see it as broad enough, which they did.     (R* interview) 
 
The regulatory compromise completed the discursive aspect of the qualification 
process, but the disputes over market practices did not end. Between 1974 and 
1980, a long chain of ‘border incidents’ occurred between the SEC and the CFTC, 
centred around the regulatory approval processes for futures contracts based on 
financial assets. In several cases, securities exchanges sued commodities exchanges 
for trading futures contracts based on financial futures, claiming that the futures 
contracts were actually securities in disguise and that the futures exchanges were 
illegally expanding their trading territory at the securities exchanges’ expense. The 
SEC and the CFTC provided advice and support to ‘their’ exchanges within the 
cases, but mostly remained out of the courtrooms themselves. One exception was a 
court case related to the GNMA-based contracts mentioned previously in this paper. 
Since 1975, CBOT had traded GNMA futures with considerable success. (In 1981, 
there were approximately 2,293,000 sales of the contract, each representing 
$100,000 in unpaid mortgage principal (US Court of appeals, 7th circuit, 1982: 
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25,719)). In early 1981, the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) submitted 
an application to its regulator, the SEC, to trade options on GNMAs. The CBOT, 
fearing that options on GNMAs would compete with its lucrative futures contract, 
sent a complaint to the SEC and when the SEC approved CBOE’s options contract, 
the CBOT filed an objectionary petition at a Federal court of appeal. The case 
brought the two regulatory agencies into direct confrontation in court, and resulted 
in a call by one of the judges for commencement of negotiations between the two 
parties:  
I did not appreciate seeing two federal agencies expend their time and 
resources fighting a jurisdictional dispute in court. I believe their efforts would 
be more wisely spent in utilizing their expertise to reach a solution, which they 
would jointly recommend to Congress.           Campbell (1982) 
The case exposed the full extent of the regulatory struggle to the public and forced 
the SEC and the CFTC to start negotiations over the shape that derivatives contracts 
would take.  
 
The GNMA case set the stage for the introduction of index-based futures, as the 
talks between the SEC and the CFTC that followed the statement above ultimately 
let to the decoupling of the exclusive link between derivative contracts and physical 
assets5. This separation between deliverable goods and derivative contracts placed 
index-based futures in direct competition with a different type of derivative contract 
– stock options. Each stock option was written on the basis of a specific stock and 
as such was dependent on the availability of that stock and a regulatory approval. 
However, the financial regulaor, the SEC approved only a limited number of stocks 
to be used as bases for options. Consequently, as option trading became more 
popular, competition among exchanges for available stocks increased and so did the 
motivation of futures exchanges (regulated by the CFTC) for the approval of index-
based futures.6  
 
As promising as indices were, there were some significant obstacles hindering their 
qualification. A prominent political, cultural and regulatory obstruction stood 
between the exchanges and the realization of index-based contracts: the 
deliverability problem. Index-based contracts could not guarantee the delivery of 
goods – such goods simply did not exist. Because no exchange of goods and funds 
was possible, index-based contracts could only be settled through the transfer of 
cash (cash settlement). As discussed earlier in the paper, the evolution of 
commodities markets shows that notions of deliverability, and its political, social 
                                                 
5
 It may be useful at this point to provide a brief explanation of index-based contracts: Stock indices 
are mathematical averages of the market prices of set groups of stocks at a given time. For example, 
a list of 500 stocks complied by Standard and Poor (S&P) is used as a basis for the S&P 500 index. 
On their own, indices are little more than mathematical representations of the markets’ price levels 
in the markets situations. In contrast, when incorporated into financial contracts, like futures or 
options, stock indices can serve as a useful market tool. Index-based futures contracts require their 
owners (buyer) and its seller to pay or receive an amount of money proportional to the difference 
between the index level at the market on expiry and the index level stated in the contract. These 
contracts allow market participants to protect their holding against sudden drops in prices. For 
example, a contract that would grant its owner, say, $25 for each index point below a certain value at 
a certain date could serve as a safety net for investors. Similarly, a contract that would pay its owner 
$25 for each index point above a certain value would make a good device for profit-seeking traders 
who hope to gain from increasing prices.  
6
 In 1978, five years after organized options trading began, options were traded in eight other SEC-
regulated exchanges. 
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and cultural implications, were institutionalized and became an inherent component 
of the institutional and cultural structure of the markets.  
 
The contrasting arguments of the SEC and the CFTC as they evolved in the period 
leading to the GNMA case framed the range of qualification options in such a way 
that left the two regulators little choice other than to cooperate. Futures were put 
under exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC, yet the products on which the indices 
were based – the stocks – were regulated by the SEC. This situation led the two 
regulators to realize that (in spite of the rivalry between the two agencies) the cash-
settlement issue should be solved co-operatively. Even the more militant among the 
SEC staff realized that cooperation was necessary. For example, H*, a senior staff 
member of the SEC who was involved in the discussions, described the situation:  
[We r]ecognized that our legal positions were less than strong. […] The SEC 
dealt with a very weak legal hand.      (H* interview) 
 
In spring 1981, while the GNMA case was still discussed in court, John Shad and 
Philip Johnson were appointed as the chairs of, respectively, the SEC and the 
CFTC.  According to Johnson, even before he took up office in Washington he 
contacted Shad and they both agreed to meet and discuss the overlapping regulatory 
areas of the two agencies (R* interview). 7 
 
Although it was essential to solve the deliverability issue, tackling it proved 
difficult. Delivering the underlying product was the practice through which the 
distinction between legitimate financial contracts and illegitimate, illegal, gambling 
was made clear. As such, deliverability formed a crucial part of a contract’s quality 
– its legality. From this legal and social perspective, replacing the contractual 
obligation to deliver a product with a cash settlement would have amounted to 
obliterating the distinction between financial markets and casinos. Hence, the 
dilemma that Shad and Johnson faced was how the heads of the two most important 
financial regulating agencies in the US would suddenly decide that cash settlement 
was different from gambling, after their agencies have been condemning the 
practice since formation?  
 
Shad and Johnson considered an approach that would circumvent the problems 
rather than tackle them directly. They simulated a scenario in which index-based 
contracts would include an obligation to deliver. For example, if sellers of index-
based futures chose to exercise their contracts and deliver the underlying assets, 
they would have to buy the stocks that composed the index that underlined the 
contract. Considering that indices are composed of any number of stocks (ranging 
from just 30 (Dow Jones) to a few hundred (Standard and Poor’s 500)), and also 
that many series of futures would expire at the same date, deliveries of the 
underling assets, would result in a sudden demand for stocks - leading to a sharp 
surge in prices. Shad and Johnson understood that even if a fraction of index-based 
contracts would be settled by delivery, then the consequential transactions may still 
cause extreme volatility in the securities markets; a situation that neither party 
wanted to induce:  
                                                 
7
 Sadly, John Shad passed away in July 1994 so it was not possible to interview him for this 
research. The material in this paper includes interviews with several high-ranking SEC staff 
members who took part in the discussions between the SEC and the CFTC, as well as Phillip 
Johnson and other CFTC staff members.  
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We didn’t want this great flood of demand for stocks... He [Shad] didn’t want 
it. He had this notion of ‘witching hours’ in the options markets, triple 
witching hours. He said: ‘I don’t need this kind of thing over here in the stock 
index side and I don’t think my guys [SEC staff] care so let’s just cash-settle 
everything. We decided that any index should be cash-settled.’   (R* interview) 
 
The ‘witching hours’ R* referred to were the last trading hours before the 
expiration of stock options. These contracts were written typically for periods of 
one month, three months, or six months and usually expired at the end of trading at 
the third Friday of the month in which the contract expires. Due to these standard 
time intervals, four times a year (on March, June, September and December) there 
occurred mutual expiration of the contracts. On those dates, at the hours before 
expiration, participants in stock markets witnessed huge price movements that 
seemed to be completely unrelated to the known information about the stocks. Such 
waves of sale and buy orders, frequently amounting to millions of dollars, did not 
only leave the traders bewildered, but also caused significant losses to many veteran 
traders (Stein, 1986). Thus, it was gradually understood that usual patterns of 
trading did not hold true on these Fridays.  
 
Shad and Johnson’s simulation exercise brought to the fore the role that 
deliverability played in the qualification and realization of index-based contracts. 
Shad and Johnson showed that the environments of ‘real assets’ and ‘synthetic 
assets’ were incompatible. According to the ‘real assets’ worldview, the absence of 
a delivery clause from financial contracts meant that those contracts were no 
different from betting. Furthermore, in a market where index-based contracts are 
traded, an obligatory delivery would be equal to calling for a market crash. 
Therefore, what was a condition of the legal existence of trading in the ‘real assets’ 
world became unbearably dangerous in the world of index-based contracts.  
 
This conceptual reconfiguration of the meaning of cash-settlement was a step in the 
creation of a new legal and practical discourse. The two regulators created a 
constitutive language act (Barnes et al, 1996) and by so doing they resolved a 
century old dissonance between a legal definition and the market practices. Namely, 
by connecting the trading practice of delivering underlying assets with the new 
index-based contracts, obligatory delivery was denounced as irrelevant and even 
dangerous. Following this new insight, Shad and Johnson were able to legitimately 
remove the deliverability obligation from their rules and in effect paved the way to 
index-based derivatives. 
 
It has to be noted, however, that the qualification process was not unidirectional – 
the new concepts that the regulators used were created in the new environments in 
which financial futures and options were traded. Shad and Johnson were able to use 
the notion of ‘witching hours’ as a discursive tool in their discussions because such 
phenomenon had existed in organized options markets for several years before they 
met. Actors who traded financial futures and options created a new market nexus of 
practices and norms, constituting a new lingual and communicative medium, which 







The ability to design derivatives on the basis of market indices is arguably one of 
the reasons behind the explosive growth of these markets in the last decades, and is 
an integral part of contemporary market technology. However, unlike other entities 
that are tradable assets in their own rights, indices are merely the products of 
mathematical procedures. Therefore, a crucial element in the qualification of index-
based derivatives was the construction of the indices as legitimate underlying 
assets. As we saw, the qualification of index-based derivatives depended on a 
concentrated effort by a heterogeneous forum of agents (exchanges and regulators) 
that together transformed the cultural, political and practical aspects of commodities 
trading into qualities that were assigned to the new financial contract. This analysis 
serves as a basis for a more general discussion regarding financial markets. In 
particular, it raises questions regarding the nature of the inter-institutional field in 
which financial markets operate and about the nature of agency in such fields.  
 
The historical narrative that traces the qualification of index-based derivatives 
reveals the dense nexus of connections between regulators and exchanges. If a 
commonly accepted worldview were to be applied to this case then the various 
actors would probably be classified as belonging to one of two archetypical groups: 
regulators and regulated. A good example for the application of such a dichotomy 
to financial markets is the characterization of Miller regarding the constitutive 
powers of financial regulators (Miller 1986). Miller suggests that many of the 
sophisticated financial derivative products existing today were developed because 
financial entrepreneurs were trying to break away from regulation8. According to 
Miller, new and innovative financial products did not fall under the existing 
regulatory definitions and thus allowed their users to be free from regulatory 
constrains such as reporting, or compliance with strict risk-mitigation practices. The 
‘action-reaction’ hypothesis makes an implicit assumption about the nature of the 
financial entrepreneurship process. According to this assumption, regulators and 
entrepreneurs are locked in an endless symbolic tennis game: the financial 
entrepreneurs launch a new type of product, which challenges the abilities of the 
existing regulatory regime, and the regulators react by changing the regulations.  
 
As index-based derivatives show us, such a sequential, bilateral model is not 
accurate. Instead, regulators and exchanges form and dissolve coalitions that cross 
the boundaries between regulators and regulated. Ayers and Braithwaite offer an 
alternative to the mutually excluding division between regulation and deregulation, 
a dichotomy they regard as arbitrary and contrived (Ayers and Braithwaite 1992). 
In their analysis, Ayers and Braithwaite predict that in complex fields, such as 
financial markets, the relations between regulators and regulated would tend to shift 
from a pattern of command and control, to an interactive pattern they refer to as 
‘enforced self-regulation’. In the second phase, the regulatory goals are still chosen 
by the regulator, but the ways in which they are attained are dependent on the 
expertise of the regulated. The ‘enforced self-regulation’ scheme implicitly assumes 
that there is a separation between the ‘what’ element of regulation (the value-based, 
                                                 
8
 Many of the examples that Miller uses are taken from ‘over the counter’ derivatives markets, 
markets that followed a different historical path from the ones described in this paper. However, 
since Miller’s argument is paraphrased in general terms it represents the ‘regulators-chase-markets’ 
approach. 
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normative demands that underline the regulatory practice) and the ‘how’ (the means 
through which these demands are tackled). Leyshon and Thrift (1996) follow a 
different disciplinary path but offer similar conclusions: they suggest that there is a 
discursive plurality in the interfaces between regulators and corporations, which 
brings about frequent changes in the content and boundaries of the economic 
system. If we add this insight to the hypothesis about enforced self-regulation we 
see that complex regulatory fields, like the one that evolved around derivatives 
markets, call for very different analytic perspectives from the ones that divide the 
institutional agents into regulators and regulated. Instead, as the historical 
description implies, in an environment where it is necessary for the institutional 
agents to cooperate in order to influence the shape of the regulatory action, the 
nature of the ties among the various actors is as important as their motivations.  
 
A theoretical perspective that assumes there is a dynamic, multi-focal regulatory 
environment sets the stage for a concept of a more decentred regulation, such as the 
one offered by Black (Black 2001, 2002). According to Black, regulation is not a 
process that the state or its agents activate, but it is rather an outcome (or the 
multiple outcomes) of interactions among actors. This approach differs radically 
from command and control approaches not only because it distributes the regulatory 
action among the agents, but also because it detaches the responsibility for the 
regulatory process from a single agent, or a group of agents, and transfers it to the 
relations among the different actors. In other words, the question ‘who regulates?’ 
is replaced with ‘how is regulation performed?’ This question, previously seen as a 
technical derivative of the regulator’s worldview, has moved to the fore. No single 
agent performs the regulation, but instead it is seen as an emerging organizational, 
political and (more recently) technological phenomenon, which  cannot be reduced 
to a string of pre-determined procedures. Instead, the network of connections 
through which regulatory activity takes place should be regarded as the 
organizational infrastructure where rules, practices and procedures evolve and take 
shape. As the case of index-based derivates shows us, such a network includes the 
various interfaces between the actors, as well as the material and technological 
artefacts that they use. 
 
This analysis of the qualification process raises questions about the nature of 
agency in financial markets. If we use the historical narrative in this paper as a 
starting point for determining who created index-based contracts, we would find 
that the answer is far from straightforward. The regulators did not create the market 
for index-based contracts in isolation.  The options traders were responsible for the 
new conceptual meaning of non-delivery contracts. In particular, it was the notion 
of ‘witching hours’ that motivated Shad and Johnson to relinquish the demand for 
delivery. Similarly, it cannot be argued that the exchanges were responsible for the 
creation of index-based contracts because, as the data show, critical aspects of the 
qualification process took place within organizational settings within which the 
exchanges had relatively little influence.  
 
A possible answer to the question of who created the first index-based derivatives is 
that the network of connections within the market is responsible for their creation. 
In other words, qualification provides us with an explanation as to why we should 
regard markets as a networked, distributed agency.  Minsky argued that intelligent 
action should be conceptualized as a large system of agencies that can be assembled 
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together in various configurations (Minsky, 1986). Hutchins expanded this concept 
to include systems that contain both humans and material objects (Hutchins, 1995). 
Hutchins showed that in a complex techno-social network the attribution of 
exclusive decision-making capacity to one actor would not be accurate. In such 
networks no single actor is the ‘commander’, nor the rest ‘subordinates’. Instead, 
whole networks of humans and machines make the decisions and perform the 
practices. In accordance, it can be said that the creation of markets for financial 
derivatives (a process that included a string of interpretations and decisions) could 
not be reduced to a simple ‘action-reaction’ narrative between the regulators and the 
exchanges. Indeed, the data shows us that each of the agents had a set of goals that 
was distinctly different from those of the other. Instead, the connections between 
the differential actors were responsible for the transformation of index-based 
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R*– Chicago, February 2000  
M*– Washington, DC., March 2001 
G*– Washington, DC., April 2001 
H*– Washington, DC., April 2001  
